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 Some enterprises do not hesitate to use illegal means to collect intelligence from their 
competitors, making trade secret protection increasingly challenging and urgent. 
—China Business Training Course on Competitive Intelligence Practices 
Shanghai, Oct. 17-18, 20081 
 
Chinese executives’ intense desire to succeed globally, combined with the Chinese 
government’s encouragement and support,2 has driven some companies to develop 
corporate competitive intelligence (CI) programs that increasingly rely on illegal human 
and technical intelligence collection methods 3,4 to acquire intangible property from U.S. 
companies and government agencies. The plethora of industrial espionage cases 
involving Chinese companies in recent years reveals extensive Chinese government 
involvement in such activity5 and the role of CI in facilitating the transfer of U.S. 
proprietary technology from civilian to military uses.6 Against this backdrop, the United 
States faces a rising national security threat from Chinese corporations that employ 
robust CI programs to enhance illegal company- or government-directed espionage and 
intellectual property (IP) theft and infringement. The complicated and global character 
of this phenomenon 7  requires that the U.S. government rethink the traditional 
intelligence community (IC) approach to collection and analysis of intelligence on China 
and the implications for homeland security. 
This article draws upon a body of Chinese literature on CI to explore the role of CI in 
helping China to conduct industrial espionage and acquire U.S. IP and illustrate how the 
study of Chinese CI can help the U.S. government and business make sense of future 
trends in Chinese industrial espionage. Chinese CI theory and practice is pushing 
Chinese intelligence in new directions; 8  however, this trend has gone relatively 
unnoticed in the U.S. intelligence and academic communities, probably because CI is 
largely viewed as the domain of private sector and professional organizations in the 
United States.9 Despite Chinese corporations’ growing reliance on CI, and the significant 
role it has played in corporate successes, many U.S. companies remain relatively 
unfamiliar with the state of Chinese corporate intelligence and the evolving risks for U.S. 
corporations.   
INTANGIBLE THREAT 
The 17th Century French missionary Louis Le Comte wrote in his memoirs that trade and 
commerce “is the soul of the (Chinese) people” and “the primum mobile of all their 
actions.”10 China’s trade and commercial genius has certainly played a major role in the 
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spectacular rise of China’s economy and its integration with the U.S. economy over the 
last several decades. Some observers view China’s growing stake in America’s economic 
system as an extremely positive development for the United States, while others see 
Beijing as a military, economic, and technological threat. Most would probably agree, 
however, that China’s growing economic power11  and massive annual trade surplus with 
the United States – $250 billion and growing – puts China in a position to affect the 
United States economy in ways considered improbable in the past.12   
Chinese firms’ increasing involvement in corporate spying and IP theft in America 
raises the stakes of the trade deficit problem with China and is the source of a great deal 
of concern for U.S. homeland security. Chinese corporations that use IP theft and 
infringement as components of their overall business model, and effectively employ 
corporate intelligence programs to that end, are damaging the foundations of the 
American corporate world: intangible property. 
Most of the value in corporations, particularly in America, remains in intangible 
property. The term “intangible property” is generally used to refer to the following non-
physical assets, such as intellectual property (e.g., patents, copyrights, trademarks, and 
trade secrets), legal rights (e.g., leases, contracts, and licenses), relationships (e.g., 
supply and custom distribution chains) and brands. According to a 2006 Brand Finance 
report in 2006, 62 percent of the value of corporations around the globe is based on 
intangibles ($19.5 trillion of global market value).13  U.S. corporations have 75 percent of 
their value tied up in intangibles.14 Not surprisingly, intangible property accounts for 98 
percent of the U.S. technology sector.15   
Intellectual property receives a lot of attention because its misappropriation can 
devastate companies, especially those in IP industries, and can have a disproportionate 
impact on countries like the United States, where IP factors so prominently in the 
overall economy. U.S. IP industries, for example, have been responsible for 
approximately 40 percent of the total growth of the U.S. economy.16  The International 
Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) released an economic study in 2007 that assessed 
U.S. copyright industries (e.g., entertainment software, motion picture, business 
software, and recording) as contributing more job growth, gross domestic product 
(GDP), and foreign exports and sales to the U.S. economy than any other industry; they 
contributed about $1.38 trillion to U.S. GDP, employed 11.3 million workers, and 
accounted for approximately $110.8 billion in foreign sales and exports in 2005.17   
OVER 300 HUNDRED YEARS OF COUNTERFEITING EXCELLENCE 
Le Comte extolled Chinese merchants for their commercial genius, but suggested they 
focus much of their “labor and natural industry” on dishonest business practices and 
counterfeit “almost everything they vend.”18 He writes: “(Chinese merchants) counterfeit 
Gammons of Bacon so artificially, that many times a Man is mistaken in them; … It is 
certain a Stranger will be always cheated, if he buy alone, let him take what care he 
will.”19  
Remarkably, Le Comte’s observations from over 300 years ago remain valid today, 
and manifest themselves in the intractable problem U.S. companies encounter doing 
business with China: how to take advantage of China’s vast trade and commercial 
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potential without losing much of the intangible value of their corporations to 
counterfeiting and other forms of infringement. 
Chinese counterfeiting and piracy levels are extremely high.  According to the IIPA’s 
2008 Special 301 Report, Chinese copyright piracy cost U.S. copyright industries almost 
$3 billion in 2007; piracy levels reached 90 percent of published records and music, 80 
percent of business software and 95 percent of entertainment software. According to the 
U.S. trade representative’s report to Congress on China’s World Trade Organization 
compliance in 2004, the value of Chinese counterfeit products brought into the U.S. 
market reached $134 million. Chinese counterfeiting also limits demand for legitimate 
U.S. IP products globally, which damages company revenues and, by extension, the U.S. 
economy. The U.S. Department of Commerce, for example, reported that Chinese 
counterfeiting cost the U.S. economy about $20-24 billion in 2004. 
Counterfeiting is not limited to Chinese street merchants. Chinese multinational 
corporations (MNC) are significant contributors to the overall counterfeiting of high-
tech products. Cisco Systems filed an IP infringement claim in 2003 against Huawei 
Technologies (a powerful Chinese MNC that produces telecommunications and 
networking equipment) for copying patented Cisco technologies, user manuals, and the 
source code used for Huawei’s counterfeit routers. In a 2005 interview with 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Warren Heit, a partner at White & Case, states that display 
cases at some of Huawei’s offices contained ‘perfect’ knock-offs of Cisco telecom and 
Polycom equipment.20  
Some Chinese MNCs view both legal IP development and illegal IP theft and 
infringement as extremely important components of their business models and key to 
their long-term profitability and survival. Huawei’s business model, for example, is 
partly based on selling counterfeit products in developing countries with poor IP 
protection. As Heit suggests: “Huawei is saying to itself… ‘I am going to knock (Cisco) 
products off and to the extent the IP law allows me to practice in these areas, I’m going 
to go there…Cisco, maybe you can have the U.S., but I’ll take you everywhere you 
haven’t gone.’”21 
Chinese corporations’ counterfeiting of high-tech equipment and IP theft raises 
concerns beyond economic loss. Counterfeit computer components from China, for 
example, could be used to compromise U.S. corporate and government computer 
networks and cause military systems to fail.22 The U.S. government in early 2008 seized 
$76 million worth of counterfeit Cisco routers, switches, WAN interface cards, and 
gigabit interface converters, which were purchased by the U.S. Naval Academy, U.S. 
Naval Air Warfare Center, General Services Administration, U.S. Naval Undersea 
Warfare Center, and defense contractor Raytheon, among others.23  Melissa Hathaway, 
director of the Director of National Intelligence’s (DNI) cyber security office, 
commented on the government’s seizure of over 400 counterfeit routers: “Counterfeit 
products have been linked to the crash of mission-critical networks, and may also 
contain hidden ‘back doors’ enabling network security to [be] bypassed and sensitive 
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COUNTERFEITER, HACKER, SOLDIER, SPY 
Chinese espionage directed against U.S. government and corporate targets is well-
documented in the recent literature. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
officials have investigated over 540 instances of illegal technology exports to China, 
which often involve Chinese corporations. The Washington Post published an article in 
April 2008 describing twelve cases of Chinese espionage that have occurred since March 
2007. The charges range from illegal export of warship technology and source codes for 
simulation software for the precision training of fighter pilots, to theft of trade secrets 
from two companies on behalf of a Chinese military program. Joel Brenner, the head of 
the counterintelligence office of the DNI, states: “Espionage used to be a problem for the 
FBI, CIA and military, but now it’s a problem for corporations…It’s no longer a cloak-
and-dagger thing. It’s about computer architecture and the soundness of electronic 
systems.”25   
The U.S. Defense Department and IC claim that China is America’s most serious 
cyber security threat.26  The Office of the DNI, in response to a Business Week inquiry, 
stated that computer intrusions have been successful against a wide range of 
government and corporate networks across the critical infrastructure and defense 
industrial base.27  A recent Business Week special report revealed Chinese hackers may 
have recently sent an e-mail attachment containing the malicious computer code to an 
executive at Booz Allen Hamilton, a $4 billion U.S. corporation, in an attempt to infect 
the company’s computer network and acquire sensitive information. According to the 
report, hackers have launched numerous similar attacks on U.S. companies and 
government agencies for the last several years; the Departments of Defense, State, 
Energy, Commerce, Health and Human Services and Treasury, and corporations Boeing, 
Lockheed Martin, General Electric, Raytheon and General Dynamics, are some of the 
known victims. The U.S. government reported the occurrence of 12,986 cyber intrusions 
and other cyber security events on government and defense contractor networks; U.S. 
military networks experienced a 55 percent increase in attacks.28 O. Sami Saydjari, a 
former National Security Agency (NSA) official, suggests the scale of organized Chinese 
hacking activities – much of which involves the Chinese military29– is having a 
devastating impact on U.S. government and corporate computer networks.30   
A number of Chinese companies aggressively employ intelligence collection methods 
that cross the line of propriety and legality, and some of them are also IP infringers.  
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. auto-parts manufacturer Metaldyne, 
one of only two corporations in the world capable of transforming powdered metal into 
high-performance engine components, was seriously damaged when one of its former 
engineers gave proprietary information to potential Chinese competitors. A Huawei 
employee illegally took photos of Fujitsu circuit boards at Supercomm in 2003; Business 
Week speculated that the employee may have also collected proprietary information 
from AT&T, Cisco, Lucent, Nortel, and Tellabs.31 The U.S. software maker 3DGeo 
Development Inc. caught several trainees of the Chinese state-owned oil company Petro 
China Co. trying to access 3DGeo’s secure computer systems; one was sentenced to two 
years in prison in 2004.32  As a result of the increased incidents, the FBI decided in 
2007 to identify the ten highest-value U.S. corporations (including General Electric, 
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DuPont and Corning) in the respective areas of the FBI’s fifty-six field offices 
throughout America and brief those corporations on the threat. 33 
Chinese government research institutes are also actively involved in trade secret theft.  
The FBI and other U.S. government agencies recently identified about 150 individuals 
and businesses involved in illegally transferring aerospace and weapons technology to 
China and Iran; the espionage may have benefited Chinese government’s space 
program.34 Most notably, the FBI arrested physicist Shu Quan-sheng, the president of a 
National Air and Space Agency (NASA) subcontractor, for allegedly exporting restricted 
U.S. technology to China to assist the development of China’s Long March V heavy 
booster. According to the federal claim, Shu allegedly transferred sensitive data on the 
components of a specialized cryogenic hydrogen tank to the People’s Liberation Army’s 
General Armaments Department and its 101st Research Institute. In a separate case, the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) reported in June 2008 that China’s Naval Research 
Center acquired Quantum3D Inc.’s Mantis 1.5.5 and viXsen trade secrets – software 
programs used to simulate real world motion and train military fighter pilots – from 
Xiaodeng Sheldon Meng, a Chinese software engineer and former employee of 
Quantum3D Inc.35 
STRATEGIC ROAD AHEAD:  CHINESE CORPORATIONS MUST 
LEAD THE WAY 
The late Professor Zheng Chengsi, father of IP in China and former director of the 
Intellectual Property Office of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), declared China’s 
economic growth in the 21st Century will largely depend on its ability to manage 
intangible property and produce enterprises capable of successfully engaging in global 
IP competition.36  Zheng’s work at CAS persuaded the State Council to develop China’s 
first National Intellectual Property Strategy – promulgated in June 2008 – and his 
intellectual imprint is reflected in the Strategy’s emphasis on transforming the way 
companies create and acquire IP overseas.37  Section 2 (12) of the Strategy emphasizes 
the importance of making the corporation “the principal entity in the creation and 
utilization of intellectual property.”  The Strategy also bears the mark of China’s 
national security experts in that it calls upon government agencies and enterprises to 
make more effective use of IP for national defense and encourages the development and 
use of civilian IP for military purposes.38   
The Strategy highlights the importance of improving China’s capacity to create IP 
and Chinese-developed standards,39  in which increased research and development 
(R&D) plays an integral role.40 On this front, Beijing has been very successful in 
inducing most large U.S. high technology firms to invest heavily in R&D in China – 
largely in the form of high-technology R&D programs and centers in exchange for 
market access and financial incentives – which is gradually helping China close the gap 
between basic research and bringing inventions to market. In addition, U.S. R&D 
activities in China not only help Chinese subsidiaries improve their own R&D 
programs,41 but could also indirectly help China’s defense-modernization efforts.42  
[L]ocal Chinese employees working at foreign R&D centers may gain an in-depth 
understanding of how foreign technologies are developed and function. In some 
instances, R&D activity has included integrating foreign technology with local 
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systems or making foreign technology compatible with Chinese technical standards. 
This latter form of knowledge transfer (systems and standards integration 
capabilities), in particular, could be of potential use to China’s defense 
modernization goals, especially in developing asymmetric capabilities. For this and 
other reasons…extensive knowledge transfers through R&D in China could pose 
risks for long-term US security as well as economic interests. 43 
China spends heavily on R&D to improve China’s capacity to rapidly absorb and adopt 
foreign technologies that can advance civilian and defense technology and IP 
development. According to the 2007 OECD report, China has become one of the most 
R&D intensive countries in the world, second only to the United States; China’s R&D 
spending in 2007 surpassed Japan’s for the first time. China’s R&D spending could 
increase 24 percent in 2008 to $216.8 billion, which is roughly 18 percent of R&D 
spending worldwide.44  China’s total R&D spending in 2007 reached approximately $175 
billion (an increase of nearly $155 billion in R&D spending since 2003). U.S. and 
Japanese spending during that same period totaled about $353 billion and $143.5 
billion, respectively. 45  The European Commission recently assessed that, if China 
continues to increase its R&D spending at the current pace, China could match the EU 
in R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP by 2009. 46 It is important to note, however, 
that government-sponsored R&D focuses primarily on applied research and technology 
development (the government used less than 6 percent of total R&D funding for basic 
research in 2002 and 2003).47 
Chinese corporations are becoming the most important contributors to the R&D 
spending in China. According to the Research Institute of Industrial Economics and 
Orebro University in Sweden, Chinese companies conducted about 68 percent of China’s 
total R&D in terms of spending in 2005, which highlights the dramatic shift from a 
government-centered to a corporate-dominated innovation system.48 
Comparisons of China’s R&D expenditures with developed countries do not account 
for the large disparities between China and the West in the quality and cost of research 
staff. As Dr. Xu Zhijun, chief marketing officer of the Chinese multinational 
telecommunications giant Huawei argues, because of China’s low labor costs and access 
to high-quality researchers, Huawei may have spent only $1.1 billion in R&D last fiscal 
year, but that is equivalent to about $4 to $5 billion spent by western rivals such as 
Cisco.49  
As suggested later in this article, the global economic downturn has important 
implications for Chinese corporate R&D programs. Chinese companies will have to 
make hard choices about R&D funding, and many of them will probably choose to focus 
exclusively on combining in-house R&D with imported technology to avoid the high 
costs and risks associated with basic and more innovative research. (This R&D strategy 
has been heavily used by legitimate companies and counterfeiters in the past for reverse 
engineering purposes). 50      
THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE  
Beijing’s push to make IP the strategic imperative of government agencies and 
corporations, as manifested in the Strategy,51 has had a significant impact on Chinese 
companies. Many Chinese executives, seeking to fulfill the government’s desire that 
SLATE, CHINA’S QUEST FOR INTANGIBLE PROPERTY 
 
 




their enterprises become the driving force behind China’s technological innovation and 
IP creation, have established new competitive intelligence (CI) units or expanded their 
existing programs.52 Chinese companies have reportedly intensified efforts to hire 
qualified Chinese CI personnel to fill a growing number of CI collection and analysis 
positions.53  
Zhong Tianwei, the Guangzhou branch manager of Beijing TRS Information 
Technology Company, 54  notes that many domestic enterprises can attribute their 
successes to CI.55 Competitive intelligence can help companies determine competitors’ 
R&D capabilities, keep informed of competitors’ product developments, assess 
competitors’ product performance, design new technologies and products, assess a 
competitor’s management strategies and decision-making capabilities, plan and manage 
R&D activities, create advanced S&T-based strategies, identify competitors interested in 
strategic alliances, and improve a company’s capability to protect its intellectual 
property from illegal human and technical collection.56  
The Mandarins’ Perspective on Competitive Intelligence 
Chinese government officials, scholars, and business strategists have written extensively 
about CI and recognize how it can help China (as it did Japan) achieve its IP goals and 
eventually become an economic superpower.57 China’s vigorous promotion of CI, and its 
subset competitive technical intelligence (CTI), have helped make these important 
topics of concern in China.58  The Chinese Ministry of Ordnance Industry’s Intelligence 
Research Institute, National Defense Science and Industry Scientific and Technical 
Intelligence Bureau, and the State Science and Technology Commission initiated a study 
comparing domestic and foreign intelligence research and held a series of seminars on 
strategic intelligence research and development from 1991 to 1994, resulting in a change 
in the direction of Chinese intelligence research work: competitive intelligence became 
its new focal point.59   
Since the mid-1990s, a growing number of Chinese PhD dissertations have focused 
on CI and the use of intelligence to advance China’s national interests.60 Many of these 
students have gone on to become influential in business, government, and academia, 
and have helped push the theoretical development of corporate intelligence in China.  
Dr. Chen Feng, for example, who received his PhD from Beijing University and wrote his 
dissertation on CI in China with the assistance of his advisor Liang Zhanping, director of 
China’s Institute of Information Science and Technology, is now a CAS associate 
researcher and senior consultant to Ding Lu Management Consultants, Ltd. and has 
advised Chinese high-technology firms how to set up CI programs.61 
U.S. and Chinese scholars have provided a myriad of definitions of CI and CTI.  
Corporate CI can generally be defined as activity related to the collection, processing, 
exploitation, analysis, and dissemination of information and finished intelligence on 
corporate competitors and pertinent industries that could impact a firm’s competitive 
situation. How narrowly or broadly a corporation defines the term depends on the 
company’s mission and the goals of its intelligence programs; generally, more resources 
and funding are required to meet intelligence goals that are broader in scope.  W. 
Bradford Ashton of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Richard Klavans of the 
Center for Research Planning define CTI as “business sensitive information on external 
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scientific or technological threats, opportunities, or developments that have the 
potential to affect a company’s competitive situation.”62 
Chinese scholars have generally accepted the above definitions, but have added 
caveats of their own. Chinese and U.S. scholars also agree that corporate intelligence 
does not and should not include unethical or illegal forms of intelligence collection, such 
as unauthorized monitoring of phone and internet communications, trade secret theft, 
etc. However, some Chinese scholars concede that a gray area exists in CI, where reverse 
engineering and IP transfer may take place without necessarily breaking the law and the 
benefit to public interest may override the ethical considerations.63  
Chinese academics point out that company intelligence efforts are necessarily 
proprietary and need to be protected. The company’s sources and methods of collecting, 
processing, and analyzing information, and the intelligence derived from such activities, 
is confidential and usually well-guarded because unauthorized disclosure could 
negatively impact the company’s competitive position. This is primarily why Chinese 
companies are so interested in “anti-competitive intelligence” (also referred to as 
counterintelligence) programs: to help protect against IP loss in the “gray area.” This is 
discussed with some frequency in the Chinese literature.64 (As will be suggested later in 
this article, U.S. companies could also benefit from increased emphasis on 
counterintelligence programs.) 
Chinese Competitive Intelligence in Practice 
Chinese corporate intelligence in practice can differ substantially from how it is 
described in scholarly works. Although Chinese scholars stress that corporate 
intelligence programs must employ ethical and legal intelligence techniques and 
methods to produce intelligence, mounting evidence suggests Chinese firms are 
increasingly using their intelligence units to enhance the effectiveness of their illegal 
activities.  Chinese espionage cases involving IP theft from U.S. companies since 2007 
indicate the emphasis China places on illegal corporate intelligence, the great risks 
China is willing to take to acquire U.S. IP, and the disregard it has for the global IP 
system (note that the Chinese government denies any illegal conduct).   
As discussed, Chinese executives and managers hope to transform their companies 
into global competitors (86 percent of Chinese executives interviewed for a McKinsey 
survey in 2008 indicated they had global ambitions). They view the development of 
corporate intelligence programs as a means to improve strategic management and help 
identify struggling U.S. firms to purchase. This ambition can drive them to turn 
otherwise ethical CI programs into illegal collection platforms. ‘The Chinese are out to 
develop a modern economy and society in one generation,’ notes Joel Brenner. ‘There is 
much about their determination that is admirable. But they’re also willing to steal a lot 
of proprietary information to do it, and that’s not admirable.65  
The most robust Chinese corporate intelligence units are likely located in R&D 
centers overseas (often called “listening posts”), where the company can most effectively 
collect intelligence from its competitors and leverage the deep expertise of its many 
high-quality and relatively low-cost scientists and engineers to analyze and evaluate the 
technology and IP the company purchases or steals.66 The Chinese literature suggests 
the intelligence units’ internal processes are generally similar to those described in some 
of the most prominent works on corporate intelligence in the west.67 The organization of 
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some of the units may differ somewhat from those in the West, but they likely combine 
personnel with formal intelligence training and those who are experts in their given 
technical or scientific fields to conduct intelligence collection, processing and 
exploitation, analysis, production, and dissemination.68 Personnel assigned to listening 
posts can use their legal collection and analysis of patents, standards, business and 
market data, and information to inform illegal collection activities and vice-versa. They 
can also rely on scientific and technical assistance from their company headquarters, 
some of which are located in high-technology science parks in China and so have direct 
access to world-class government research institutes and universities (many of which 
employ scientists, engineers and academicians who have undoubtedly developed a 
corpus of useful knowledge and techniques related to obtaining proprietary and 
classified information from U.S. corporate and government laboratories).69, 70   
These listening posts – some of which may receive Chinese government intelligence 
and military financial support and collection guidance71 – may also employ illegal 
technical collection techniques (such as hacking) in the United States to obtain 
proprietary information from key U.S. competitors.  Brenner claims Chinese hackers, on 
behalf of a Chinese corporation, hacked into “a large American company” to obtain 
sensitive company information prior to an impending business negotiation between the 
U.S. and Chinese companies. In a National Journal article, Brenner recounted the 
following incident: “The [U.S. business] delegation gets to China and realizes, ‘These 
guys on the other side of the table know every bottom line on every significant 
negotiating point.’ They had to have got this by hacking into [the company’s] systems.”72 
Chinese illegal technical collection threatens U.S. corporate facilities worldwide and 
puts U.S. R&D centers operating in China at risk. In late 2007, Jonathan Evans, the 
director general of Britain’s domestic intelligence agency MI5, warned 300 firms 
operating in the UK of growing evidence that state-sponsored Chinese hackers were 
attacking corporate networks and stealing proprietary information.73  Although U.S. 
technology firms likely have physical and operational security procedures in place in 
their facilities inside China, they are probably no match for China’s corporate and 
government intelligence services – among the most effective in human and technical 
intelligence collection in the world.74  Microsoft Corporation, which intends to invest 
one billion dollars in China R&D over the next three years, will undoubtedly be a target 
for domestic Chinese competitors. 
RETHINKING THE INTELLIGENCE PARADIGM 
Roger George, senior analyst at the CIA’s Global Futures Partnership, argues the 
traditional intelligence paradigm, which was relatively successful in dealing with state-
centric problems, is less effective at collecting and analyzing global and transnational 
phenomena. These emerging challenges are ‘blind spots’ that are difficult for analysts 
operating under traditional organizational and functional constraints to identify and 
understand.75  The global character of Chinese corporate espionage challenges the 
effectiveness of traditional U.S. intelligence and law enforcement efforts.76  An analysis 
of recent studies and press reports also suggests the U.S. IC and law enforcement 
communities still lack sufficient resources and expertise to effectively collect and 
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analyze data and information on Chinese espionage activities directed against U.S. 
companies worldwide. 
Although the Cox Report was written a decade ago, many of its findings are relevant 
today. The report acknowledges the U.S. government cannot “completely monitor PRC 
activities in the United States” because of the scope of China’s “decentralized collection 
efforts.”77 According to the report, the CIA, Department of Commerce, FBI, and DoD 
never considered Chinese technology acquisition an intelligence priority. They failed to 
establish collection requirements to obtain information on Chinese government or 
commercial efforts to acquire U.S. technology companies, identify and obtain advances 
in U.S. technology, or establish business relationships with U.S. high-technology 
companies. Nor did U.S. agencies establish requirements to examine commercial 
affiliations between Chinese foreign nationals and U.S. companies. 78  The Select 
Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives determined U.S. government agencies 
only conducted “narrow” or “reactive” monitoring of Chinese business activities rather 
than taking more proactive measures.79  “[T]here is little or no coordination,” states the 
report, “within the U.S. Government of counterintelligence that is conducted against the 
PRC-directed efforts to acquire sensitive U.S. technology.”80   
The IC’s scientific and technical (S&T) intelligence framework – an outgrowth of the 
Cold War  which largely collects and analyzes key S&T data and information within a 
classified system81 to understand foreign weapons platforms and identify emerging S&T 
threats,82 remains ill-suited to adequately handle evolving Chinese corporate espionage 
focused on IP theft and infringement. Under this S&T paradigm, Chinese CI would not 
likely be considered relevant for S&T collection and analysis (the IC would probably 
view it as a business or management issue) and IP would be treated primarily as an 
economic, legal, and trade-related matter. Chinese academics, government, and 
industry, however, encourage greater collaboration between government and industry 
intelligence programs83 and largely view S&T and IP as inseparable, whether from an 
intelligence or economic perspective.   
Dr. Rob Johnston, in his 2005 study on analytic culture in the IC, suggests there is a 
separation of the domains of S&T and economic intelligence and expertise within the 
analytic community.84 To the extent that situation now exists and is not mitigated 
through collaboration, some S&T and economic analysts, who are looking at data and 
information from the perspective of their areas of focus and expertise, may overlook 
critical IP and R&D data and information that directly impacts analytic judgments on 
S&T developments in China.85  An economic analyst who has spent a career learning the 
tenets of economic analysis may not understand how unique IP and R&D data and 
information could inform S&T intelligence analysis, 86  or consider how Chinese 
corporate intelligence impacts trade and innovation. If such issues are not overlooked, 
they would probably fall under the purview of analysts working on transnational matters; 
those analysts may or may not have extensive scientific, technical, or economic expertise, 
or even speak Chinese (RAND suggests the IC’s expertise and focus on S&T analysis and 
the assessment of foreign R&D programs has decreased).87 88  
The lines between Chinese intelligence, military, and commercial activities are not 
truly ‘blurred.’ The blurring of the lines cited in the Cox Report89 demonstrates how the 
IC has tried to apply a Western construct to understanding Chinese business and 
intelligence practices. As suggested from the evidence in previous sections of this article, 
SLATE, CHINA’S QUEST FOR INTANGIBLE PROPERTY 
 
 




there are no strict legal lines separating Chinese intelligence activities from the 
corporate world as exist in the United States.  Chinese corporations are always subject to 
extensive government influence and control, and many companies prefer having close 
links to the government for protection and access to resources and information that can 
give them a competitive advantage. 
The barrier the IC has created between S&T and IP could create an imbalance in the 
allocation of resources and funding for collection and analysis of the issues. This could 
influence which U.S. agencies handle certain requirements and how IC offices are 
organized and staffed to deal with particular analytic problem sets; it could hinder 
collaboration and increase analytic error.90   
The IC lists its intelligence collection priorities in the National Intelligence Priorities 
Requirements Framework (NIPF), which emphasizes about twelve priority intelligence 
targets, countries, or issues out of 150, according to a 2008 study by the RAND 
Corporation.91  The NIPF ranking of the relative importance of these priorities affects 
government resource allocations and those of the most critical importance to the 
country receive more funding for collection and analysis. 92  The RAND study 
characterizes priorities such as terrorism, WMD proliferation (an S&T intelligence issue) 
and China as NIPF “crosscutting problems or theme-areas.”93  The study points out the 
“NIPF has great value for many uses, but it also provides an incentive to reduce 
spending resources on all but the hottest current priorities, often at the expense of 
deeper assessments of longer-term challenges.”94   
Many U.S. policymakers tend to look to organizations such as the Department of 
State, DOJ, and the U.S. Patent and Trademark office for expertise on IP and other IP-
related issues. Trade secret theft – one area of IP most often discussed in the 
intelligence context – is largely seen as the purview of agencies dealing with domestic 
counterintelligence matters, such as the FBI.95 Because of this, some other IC agencies, 
which are in the position to assist the FBI, might not be doing so because of cultural or 
institutional barriers.   
It is also difficult for the U.S. government to impress upon companies the seriousness 
of the threat and persuade them to respond appropriately. Some U.S. corporations 
might be unwilling to assist the FBI or Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – for 
example, by revealing the fact a Chinese corporation has stolen proprietary information 
through human or technical intelligence collection methods – to avoid potentially 
negative repercussions for their business interests in China or damage to shareholder 
confidence.96   
There are also indications that U.S. companies are still not taking the Chinese 
seriously. A recent McKinsey survey suggests that while U.S. executives view Chinese 
corporations as a significant threat, few (28% of respondents) have taken sufficient 
steps to counter the threat because of a perception that Chinese firms are relatively weak 
in product quality, marketing, and brand development. The report observes: “This 
lackluster reaction to the global ambitions of Chinese companies raises the question of 
whether business executives elsewhere are setting themselves up for some unhappy 
competitive surprises.”97 
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THE COMING STORM 
Chinese leaders have made it clear that they want to reinvent China’s role in the world 
economy and move from dependence on foreign technology and direct investment to a 
country that rivals the United States in terms of industrial and technological power.  
They recognize that this requires promoting and rewarding scientific discovery and true 
innovation, increasing IP ownership, developing new technology standards, and making 
it possible for Chinese corporations to play an even greater role in foreign technology 
acquisition and IP transfer. China has made considerable advances in developing 
favorable national and local S&T, IP, and business policies, and has increased its 
emphasis on education and R&D.  
Chinese companies have shown they can effectively absorb and adopt U.S. technology 
and IP to push innovation. According to Curtis Carlson and William Wilmot of SRI 
International, the company that pioneered innovations such as the computer mouse and 
robotic surgery, China is working with preeminent partners around the globe to create 
the future technologies, attaining parity with the United States in some areas such as 
nanotechnology. 98  Along these lines, Frans van Houten, CEO of the European 
semiconductor company NXP, states China is now home to about 400 semiconductor 
firms that design chips and some of these companies will rapidly become top-notch 
innovators.99 Motorcycle suppliers, designers, and manufacturers, in Chongqing, China, 
have collaborated to develop a unique entrepreneurial network and business model 
called ‘localized modularization’, which allows manufacturers to request parts from 
suppliers without specifying details; i.e., makers note the size and weight of the parts in 
their orders and suppliers decide what parts to provide. This push to innovate is 
contributing to the rapid expansion of China’s patent system: Chinese domestic patent 
applications grew from 165,773 in 2001 to 470,342 in 2006.100 
Some observers are very optimistic about China’s largely untapped capacity to 
innovate. The National Science Foundation estimates China could graduate about four-
times more engineering PhDs than America in the next several years. Based on their 
observations of the work of Chinese scientists, engineers, and researchers, Carlson and 
Wilmot believe the Chinese are just as creative as their Western counterparts; there is 
ample evidence of creativity and entrepreneurial ambition in Chinese firms.101  Many 
Chinese engineers and scientists who received their PhDs in the United States, some of 
whom played important roles in successful innovations in U.S. high-tech firms, are now 
returning to China.102  
At the same time, Chinese industrial espionage and IP misappropriation, often done 
with the support or knowledge of the government, shows China is also willing to 
disregard the traditional rules of the game when convenient and take great risks to 
acquire U.S. government secrets and corporate proprietary information to the detriment 
of U.S. national security. As demonstrated earlier, a number of the most well-known and 
powerful Chinese corporations actively engage in IP misappropriation, theft, and 
reverse engineering and solicit IP transfer from their foreign competitors’ former 
employees. To date, intense U.S. corporate and government pressure on the Chinese 
government to improve the enforcement of IP rights has had limited results. Clearly, the 
blowback for Chinese espionage has not been severe enough for some Chinese 
companies to stop their illegal activities.   
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Against this backdrop, one wonders how long U.S. technology firms – despite their 
current comparative advantage in S&T and IP – will be able to withstand Chinese 
competition. Many U.S. scholars and business leaders might argue that most U.S. firms 
will not succumb to Chinese competitive pressure until China improves its capability to 
innovate and strengthen its IP base vis-à-vis the United States. This could take several 
decades at a minimum. However, some of these same U.S. observers (perhaps due to 
bias, mirror imaging, apathy or hubris) fail to take seriously a question that weighs 
heavily on the minds of many Chinese executives with global aspirations and 
government leaders who want to turn China into a superpower: “How can we further 
improve the effectiveness of our CI programs, whether it be through legal or illegal 
means, to continue to close the IP gap with U.S. companies?”  
ECONOMIC DOWNTURN CREATES OPPORTUNITIES  
The global economic crisis is having a major impact on Chinese companies and trade.  
Chinese President Hu Jintao recently told members of the Communist Party that the 
global economic downturn is hurting China’s competitive advantage in trade and 
threatens Party legitimacy and ability to rule. 103  Chinese leaders are growing 
increasingly concerned that the economic crisis, which has significantly reduced 
demand for Chinese exports and played a major role in the collapse of over 68,000 
small Chinese companies, will leave millions of workers unemployed and lead to 
widespread domestic unrest.104   
As the situation worsens, the pressure for Huawei and other MNCs to gain a 
competitive edge over U.S. and European competitors grows. Huawei’s CEO called on 
his employees in July to prepare “psychologically” for the impending downturn; 
employees must work in “crisis mode” to ensure growth and innovation.105  The pressure 
of working for Huawei is well-known in China, and employee depression and suicides 
have been on the rise this year, according to Chinese press reports.  A Huawei employee, 
speaking on condition of anonymity, said that overtime is part of employee evaluations 
and the corporate culture encourages overtime to shorten product cycles and remain 
competitive vis-à-vis international giants.106  
Huawei and some other large Chinese companies view the crisis as an opportunity to 
invest in the United States and acquire Western IP at an excellent value.107  Recent press 
reports, for example, suggest Huawei will continue to expand in the U.S. market in 
2009.108  China Mobile Ltd. also intends to set up its first R&D center outside of China 
(in California’s Silicon Valley in 2009) to assist its work on Internet and 
telecommunications integration. Donald Straszheim, an economist and vice chair of 
Roth Capital Partners, which has handled the financing of Chinese companies, states: 
“In the global recession, Chinese companies are looking around the world to acquire 
knowledge.”109 Chinese employees of Frog Design, a consulting firm that develops 
innovative products for Fortune 500 companies, take the following view of the crisis: 
In China, the rule of the game is always "Stay One Step Ahead of Your 
Competitors”…[W]hen Chinese businesses run out of initiatives in which to invest 
their capital or when their investments stop…they make a concerted effort 
to…invest in research and development. In fact, senior executives in some 
companies have said publicly that in the near future they would either invest in 
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their own health and personal happiness, or they would increase R&D budgets in 
their businesses to invest in better products to prepare for a new run when the 
downturn ends…This puts a premium on vision and strategic planning instead of 
short-term financial risk taking.110 
Some companies, which lack funds for R&D because of the credit crunch, may simply 
decide to engage in IP theft to maintain an edge over competitors.  Michael Kump, a 
lawyer specializing in IP law, contends:   
As economic conditions tighten and people start looking for ways to cut corners 
and gain an advantage, some will cross the line…in an illegal manner. One of the 
classic shortcuts is to steal competitors’ intellectual property. It can be quicker to 
target key employees at a successful competitor and try to get those employees to 
come over to your side than to invest in process and grow your business the right 
way.111  
PriceWaterhouseCoopers notes that established Chinese companies can greatly benefit 
from employee IP transfer; former U.S. technical specialists can receive financial 
support to establish start-up companies that rely on the proprietary knowledge obtained 
from their U.S. employers.112   
As the global economy continues to weaken, Chinese corporations will likely seek to 
expand their CI and R&D activities in the United States to increase productivity and 
improve their competitive positions. This growth will include acquiring struggling U.S. 
technology firms or their R&D centers, which could result in windfall IP transfers to 
Chinese firms. Jin Chen, a professor at Zhejiang University, asserts that Holly, a Chinese 
conglomerate, used its wholly-owned subsidiary in the U.S. to identify and acquire the 
Code-Division Multiple Access R&D unit from Phillips Electronics, which gave Holly 
rights to all IP at the facilities and many experienced engineers. The acquisition allowed 
Holly to improve its mobile telephone chip designs and position in the Chinese 
telecommunications market.113 Other notable examples include Lenovo’s purchase of 
IBM’s personal-computer business, the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation 
acquisition of Rover technology to create the Roewe brand,114  and Huawei’s purchase of 
Marconi to tap European markets and relationships with local carriers.115   
The list of high technology companies that are reducing their technical staff is 
growing. Sun Microsystems Inc. announced in early November 2008 that it would lay 
off about 6,000 employees. Teradyne Inc., the leading maker of microchip test 
equipment, stated it would release about 185 workers worldwide. National 
Semiconductor Corp., which makes chips, decided to lay off 330 employees and Applied 
Materials Inc., a manufacturer of chip equipment, announced it would cut 1,800 
positions.116  Some Chinese companies may increase efforts to hire recently laid-off 
employees of U.S. high technology firms, which could be a growing source of IP 
transfer.117 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are provided for the consideration of the U.S. 
government: 
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Take Steps to Encourage the Chinese Government and Industry to Stop 
Illegal Industrial Espionage and Large-Scale Intellectual Property Theft 
Thus far, complaints from the U.S. government and industry to stop this illegal behavior 
have either been met with Chinese government denials, abject disregard, or half-hearted 
enforcement efforts. Although U.S.-China trade agreements have had some success in 
curbing IP infringement, U.S. IP industries claim Chinese IP infringement is still 
occurring at unacceptable levels.  It would be neither fair nor accurate to attribute all 
industrial espionage and IP misappropriation to the Chinese government, or state that 
all Chinese firms are engaged in this sort of behavior. However, the mounting evidence 
of Chinese illegal activities is creating a dark cloud of mistrust regarding Chinese 
business practices that fuels the more pessimistic views of Beijing’s plans and intentions. 
U.S. government representatives should impress upon their Chinese counterparts 
that this behavior could have a long-term negative impact on U.S. public perception of 
China. In addition, given the level of Chinese industrial espionage, the U.S. government 
should consider enacting laws that would impose more severe sanctions on Chinese 
companies whose employees are caught stealing U.S. technology and IP. 
Closely Review Proposals of Chinese Companies to Purchase R&D Centers 
of U.S. High-Technology Companies   
Huawei proposed to purchase its U.S. competitor 3Com last year, which would have 
given it access to technology supplied to the Pentagon.118  Although this was clearly a 
case in which national security interests were at stake, a closer examination of future 
high-technology purchase proposals may reveal security implications that are not quite 
so obvious.  
Make CI a New Strategic Theme in the IC  
The IC should consider designating CI as a new ‘strategic research theme’ to help 
identify and monitor new trends in foreign intelligence that could impact homeland 
security. 119    China has made CI the center of its intelligence studies and, as mentioned, 
this is having an impact on Chinese government intelligence research. CI exerts an 
important influence on the evolution of intelligence programs in other countries as well.  
In France, for example, CI “involves all levels of government, numerous support 
organizations from the private and public sectors as well as public private partnerships 
and quasi-governmental organizations, like the Chamber of Commerce and Industry…or 
the Agency for the Diffusion of Information and Technology.”120   
Develop Programs on IP and CI at U.S. Government Civilian and Military 
Colleges and Universities   
The extensive Chinese literature on CI has provided a window into a side of China that 
one is otherwise hard-pressed to find: a detailed discussion of Chinese government 
intelligence and counterintelligence operations. CI gave the Chinese a vehicle through 
which they could once again openly discuss intelligence and operations within the 
politically safe context of international business. At the same time, U.S. literature and 
understanding on the subject is relatively inadequate, with few books having been 
written on the subject of Chinese intelligence operations. Against this backdrop, the U.S. 
government should develop courses and sub-discipline programs at government civilian 
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and military colleges and universities to train and educate students and professionals in 
IP and CI matters.  
Devote More Funding to Collection and Analysis   
As part of this effort, the IC should devote more resources and funding to collection and 
analysis of the Chinese S&T and IP collection issues. As S&T intelligence requirements 
are part of the NIPF (National Intelligence Priorities Requirements Framework), 
according to the RAND report IP requirements should be combined with S&T 
requirements and ranked among the ‘hottest priorities.’ The IC should also require 
Chinese S&T analysts to obtain a deeper understanding IP issues and the development 
of Chinese language skills.  S&T analysts who do not have S&T backgrounds should be 
required to obtain formal training and education in critical S&T areas.  
The IC also needs more intelligence officers to devote to the problem. Despite the 
rapid increase in cyber security incidents and illegal technology transfer activities in 
America, the number of officers available to handle these cases remains limited. For 
example, the number of FBI agents assigned to handle Chinese spying activities in the 
United States has only risen from 150 in 2001 to 350 in 2007.121  
Develop a Cadre of Analysts, Scientists, and Technical Personnel with 
Chinese Language Proficiency   
The IC also requires more S&T analysts fluent in Chinese. As suggested in some of the 
declassified National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) on China (from 1949 to 1976), the IC 
had difficulty assessing the strategic objectives, military, and scientific and technical 
capabilities of China because the IC lacked collection in some areas and was forced to 
rely on Chinese press reporting.122  Given China’s intense secrecy today, IC China 
analysts are perhaps forced to rely on Chinese open source material more than analysts 
focusing on other foreign countries. 123   
Unfortunately, only a limited number of IC analysts can read Chinese; translating 
scientific and technical Chinese documents requires specialized skill. More China 
analysts must develop the capability to read and understand scientific and technical 
Chinese. Developing this skill is especially crucial for today’s S&T analysts because of 
the great strides China is making in S&T and R&D (many key Chinese S&T documents 
and books have only been published in Chinese).  
 
The following recommendations are provided for the consideration of U.S. corporations: 
Establish or Strengthen Competitive Intelligence Programs   
U.S. corporate executives and managers also need to develop or strengthen intelligence 
and counterintelligence programs in their companies. Some Chinese companies are 
outperforming their U.S. competitors in this area, and their successes can provide useful 
lessons for U.S. companies doing business with China. The consensus in the Chinese 
literature on CI is that training and education is essential for a successful CI program.124 
Although U.S. companies also understand this is important, they lag far behind some 
Chinese companies in CI training and education. For example, while DuPont employees 
are required to complete online training regarding insider risks,125 employees in some 
Chinese companies are obtaining their doctorates in CI.126  
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Consider Sending Employees to Outside Competitive Intelligence 
Training Courses   
Company employees could learn a great deal about CI matters by attending outside CI 
training courses in China and the United States. Chinese companies send employees to 
CI courses held in various cities in China. The Chinese Business Training Network 
(CBTN) offers CI courses in China almost monthly. The course syllabus covers the 
following selected topics: goals of intelligence and competitive intelligence collection; 
using intelligence analysis and production methods; preventing disclosure of 
proprietary information during company visits; developing insiders in competitors’ 
companies; creation of social networks to find and recruit key IT personnel; creating CI 
units within the company; establishing clear lines of communication and support with 
other departments; protecting trade secrets; identifying and neutralizing intelligence 
threats; and case studies on real espionage cases and lessons learned (including case 
studies based on traditional CIA espionage operations and Chinese corporate 
counterintelligence investigations).127 
Increase Collaboration with Government Agencies and Heed 
Government Warnings     
Although the FBI and DHS have set up official groups within which U.S. companies can 
confidentially reveal their computer network vulnerabilities to the government,128 some 
companies remain loath to do so, for reasons mentioned previously. The National 
Journal’s recent article on Chinese hacking also suggests that some U.S. companies view 
government warnings as alarmist hyperbole.129  
Strengthen Protection of Sensitive Data and Consider the Long-term Risks 
Associated with Lay-Offs of Employees with Knowledge of Critical 
Proprietary Information  
As high-technology corporations increase employee lay-offs, they must take steps to 
ensure their sensitive data is well protected. Current information storage technologies, 
such as USB drives and other devices, have facilitated the ability of employees to take 
vast amounts of proprietary information to a company’s competitors.130  Cadence Design 
Systems, a software company, developed standard operating procedures – consisting of 
strict access and document controls, enterprise rights management and 
compartmentalization – to control the unauthorized release of such proprietary 
information. Cadence also employs modular software development procedures to 
compartmentalize information when conducting R&D in developing countries. 131 
However, the potential problem with such a method is that all of the money and effort 
put into its design can be lost if only one trusted employee with access to the right 
proprietary data departs the company and works for a competitor. Many U.S. high-
technology corporations, with the sole aim of cutting costs, often release employees 
without even assessing how they could damage compartmentalization efforts and long-
term market position. 
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The U.S.-China Economic Security and Review Commission warns in its 2007 annual 
report that, as U.S. companies continue to develop new technologies in hundreds of 
high-tech factories and joint R&D facilities in China, Chinese espionage poses the most 
significant threat to U.S. technology. If the U.S. government and industry cannot 
adequately control Chinese espionage in America, they certainly cannot expect to stop 
massive IP infringement and theft from U.S. R&D centers and other facilities located in 
China. Although U.S. IP industries can continue to push for stronger legislation (in both 
America and China) that would increase the penalties for Chinese companies and 
individuals involved in espionage, they must take steps to protect their intangible 
property to maintain their competitive positions worldwide.   
China’s large-scale infringement and theft of IP hurts the U.S. economy and, at the 
same time, helps advance Chinese science and technology, improve new weapons 
systems, and develop new products and processes. If America cannot do better at 
curbing these activities, then it becomes imperative for the IC to develop more robust 
methods of following Chinese S&T developments and informing policymakers of their 
potential ramifications. As U.S. preeminence in S&T and IP begins to wane, the 
importance of tracking and understanding emerging trends – such as CI in China – 
grows. Left unchecked, Chinese illegal forms of intelligence collection will enhance 
China’s corporate intelligence programs and competitive advantage to the detriment of 
U.S. corporations and the U.S. economy. 
China must strengthen efforts to cooperate with the United States on stopping such 
illegal activities, which greatly damage China's image and could push American public 
opinion toward protectionism or economic retaliation during an extended economic 
downturn.132 As the cases of contaminated Chinese food products and toys demonstrate, 
the short term economic benefits of unscrupulous and illegal behavior is not worth the 
long-term damage to the image of Chinese corporations and their business practices in 
the United States. The majority of ethical Chinese businessmen and laborers have 
worked too hard over the last several decades to watch their many successes become 
tarnished by the refusal of the Chinese government and unscrupulous corporations to 
admit and stop such wrongdoing. 
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